My customers have rights

My customers are not the Gambling Commission’s property

By Geoffrey Banks | 22 October 2026

I’ve been a bookmaker for decades despite not being that old. I’ve taken bets from people I’ve known for most of my working life. Some are wealthy, some aren’t. Some bet hundreds, others thousands. Most understand perfectly well what they’re doing. Gambling involves risk.

They’re my customers. Not the Gambling Commission’s.

They are adults spending their own money on a lawful pastime. They expect me to offer competitive odds, honour their bets, pay their winnings and treat them with honour.

They don’t expect to explain their salaries, savings, pensions or personal wealth to a stranger simply because they enjoy gambling. Or share it with my staff, quite understandably

And they certainly don’t expect a regulator to decide, years afterwards, whether I should have allowed them to bet.

Yet that is increasingly what the Gambling Commission’s enforcement department is doing.

The latest example is L&L Europe, which has agreed a substantial regulatory settlement following a Commission investigation. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/public-register/public-statement/detail/l-and-l-europe-limited-public-statement

There were genuine failings. Delayed withdrawals, inadequate responses to repeated failed deposits and breaches of agreed customer limits are matters a regulator should address.

But among the findings was criticism that L&L had not adequately established whether customer expenditure was proportionate to income or wealth.

There it is – affordability checks!

And although Andrew Rhodes has left the Gambling Commission to balls it up at Harris Hagen, the policies developed under his leadership have not simply disappeared with him. They’re doubling down on insane

Sarah Gardner is now Acting Chief Executive. The Commission remains responsible for explaining why its enforcement decisions demand financial assessments that its published policy says it doesn’t require.

Customers don’t want financial interrogation to have a bet.

The Commission talks endlessly about protecting customers. It might consider listening to them before they all end up at Stake. Com

Many customers have made their objections to intrusive financial checks perfectly clear. They don’t want to hand over bank statements, payslips or access to their financial transactions to justify having a bet.

The Commission itself acknowledges that document checks are unpopular. Its financial risk assessment proposals are specifically intended to reduce reliance on them.

So why does its enforcement activity continue to encourage operators to investigate customers’ income and wealth?

I know customers who would sooner close an account than disclose their personal finances. I don’t blame them.

When did a bookmaker become entitled to examine someone’s bank statements simply because they want £500 on a horse?

And why should a successful businessman, who has spent decades accumulating his own wealth, have to prove to a gambling company that he’s allowed to enjoy it?

We don’t demand financial assessments before someone buys an expensive holiday, a luxury car or a painting.

Gambling carries risks, and those risks justify appropriate regulation. They do not justify treating every customer who spends substantial sums as financially incompetent.

The Commission increasingly forgets the difference.

Where is the evidence that these interventions work?

Here is the question Parliament should be asking.

Where is the convincing evidence that the financial interventions being imposed on customers actually reduce problem gambling?

Not evidence that some gamblers experience financial difficulties. We know that.

Not evidence that a credit-reference agency can identify missed payments or defaults. That is what credit-reference agencies do.

I mean evidence that requiring operators to interrupt betting, demand documents, investigate wealth and restrict customers produces a measurable reduction in gambling harm.

The Commission’s financial risk assessment pilot examined whether financial vulnerability could be identified and whether assessments could be conducted with minimal disruption.

That is not proof that the resulting interventions prevent problem gambling.

The Commission has decided to introduce financial risk assessments in stages and says it will continue evaluating their impact.

Yet operators are already being criticised through enforcement for failing to undertake financial enquiries that resemble the affordability assessments the Commission says it doesn’t require.

The burden should be on the regulator to demonstrate that its interventions are necessary, effective and proportionate. To prove these overbearing imposition on people are worthwhile

Instead, bookmakers face the financial consequences of failing to intervene, while the benefits of those interventions remain insufficiently demonstrated.

That is a remarkably one-sided arrangement.

Apparently, winning is now suspicious

Consider the recent Rank settlement involving Grosvenor Casinos.

The Commission criticised the absence of safer gambling interactions with a long-standing, wealthy customer who lost a substantial amount.

In another example, an established customer won around £260,000, subsequently lost £250,000 over 12 days and remained £10,000 ahead.

The Commission nevertheless criticised the absence of recorded safer gambling interactions.

A customer wins £10,000 and the regulator finds fault with the operator.

A pattern of substantial gambling is not, by itself, proof that the customer has a gambling problem. Nor does a wealthy customer become financially vulnerable merely because the regulator considers the sums involved large.

What troubles me is the disappearance of proportion and context.

I know customers for whom a £5,000 bet is entirely ordinary. I know others for whom £100 is significant.

That is why personal knowledge and commercial judgment matter.

But the Commission’s approach encourages operators to disregard that knowledge and intervene defensively, because an ex copper in the enforcement department may take a different view two years later.

If a bookmaker intervenes unnecessarily, the customer suffers the inconvenience. If the bookmaker doesn’t intervene, the Commission may impose a substantial settlement.

The regulator faces neither consequence.

A policy the enforcement department appears to ignore

In May 2025 the Commission explicitly stated that it had no regulatory requirements for affordability checks and wasn’t proposing any.

Andrew Rhodes had previously explained to Parliament that affordability policy was being addressed through the Government’s Gambling Act Review White Paper process.

He has since departed. But his departure doesn’t repeal the Commission’s published policy.

Indeed, senior Commission officials subsequently made clear that the organisation intended to continue the regulatory approach established during his tenure.

Sarah Gardner therefore inherits a question that Rhodes never satisfactorily resolved.

The Commission distinguishes financial risk assessments from traditional affordability checks, saying they identify serious financial difficulties rather than calculate what a customer can afford.

Yet in the L&L case, enforcement criticised failures to assess whether expenditure was proportionate to wealth or income.

One customer deposited £4,400 within eight hours. The Commission questioned the provenance of the money, including the absence of evidence that it originated from employment, business income or savings.

Other warning signs justified AML enquiries. But money won from another bookmaker isn’t inherently suspicious, and customers aren’t obliged to finance their gambling from wages.

Checking whether funds are legitimate is one thing. Assessing whether a customer is sufficiently wealthy to gamble is another.

If the Commission’s policy says affordability checks aren’t required, why does its enforcement department appear to be demanding financial judgments that serve much the same purpose?

Sarah Gardner should explain whether enforcement is applying the Commission’s policy or developing its own.

When did an operator’s own policy become law?

L&L’s internal procedures said customer funds should ideally be evidenced as coming from employment or business income.

The Commission criticised the company for not following those procedures.

The LCCP requires effective AML controls, including proper implementation of relevant policies. But an operator’s voluntary precaution doesn’t automatically become an additional licence condition.

If a bookmaker introduces safeguards beyond the regulatory minimum, should it face greater punishment merely because it hasn’t followed every detail of them?

That creates a perverse incentive.

Write an ambitious compliance manual and hand the Commission more ammunition. Write the bare minimum and give it fewer opportunities to find fault.

The regulator should be encouraging operators to improve their procedures, not using voluntary commitments as an excuse to enlarge their regulatory obligations.If so, what should John Pierce and his merry band of stormtroopers in the enforcement unit fine themselves for departure from aim to permit, for example? Or application of affordability based enforcement? That’s a material breach. How many millions Mr Pierce should you pay?

If failures against those voluntary standards are increasing financial settlements, the Commission should explain how those penalties are calculated.

An operator shouldn’t be punished twice for the same underlying deficiency because it also happens to appear in its own manual.

The operators have helped create this mess

The industry cannot escape criticism either.

Major bookmakers began conducting their own affordability checks, often introducing restrictions and demands for financial information that went beyond what the Commission had expressly required. Unquestionably this was, in part l, driven by a desire to profile all clients and filter out traders

Instead of challenging the regulatory direction, parts of the industry effectively implemented it themselves.

Customers paid the price in intrusive questions, delayed transactions and closed accounts. They’ve departed gambling or opened up in Curaçao

Then came the settlements.

Rank, QuinnBet, Petfre, L&L and others have agreed substantial payments rather than fight the Commission’s interpretation through potentially lengthy and expensive proceedings.

I understand why, but it won’t be my direction of travel, these enforcement types deserve their day in front of a judge. In fact appeasement, driven by their lawyers, has been disastrous.

When a regulator controls the licence on which your business depends, today’s supine breed of industry lawyers advise you to settle rather than risk a contested enforcement action, a much larger penalty or even revocation.

For an individual company, that may be commercially sensible.

Each settlement, however, allows the Commission to publish another interpretation of the rules. The next operator is expected to have learned the lesson. Another settlement follows, and the interpretation gains further unmerited authority a judge would clearly reject.

Nobody has to prove that the Commission’s interpretation would survive a serious legal challenge.

The operators pay, their lawyers close the file, and enforcement moves on to its next target. Oh, and they love a good public razzing of the operators.

A habit has developed. The Commission investigates, the operator negotiates, the lawyers recommend settlement, and another public statement enlarges the expectations imposed on everyone else.

The operators have helped build the machinery now being used against them.

And their customers have had remarkably little say in any of it.

Is enforcement acting beyond its powers?

Licence condition 12.1.1 addresses anti-money-laundering controls. Social responsibility code 3.4.3 requires monitoring for indicators of harm and appropriate customer interaction.

Neither expressly imposes a general requirement to assess every customer’s gambling expenditure against income or wealth.

Yet enforcement statements increasingly appear to demand financial investigations beyond the Commission’s own description of its regulatory requirements.

That raises two separate issues.

First, whether enforcement is operating outside the Commission’s stated policy. On the evidence of these cases, there is a serious question for Sarah Gardner to answer. Before she departs to work for Harris Hagen of course

Second, whether particular enforcement expectations are ultra vires — beyond the Commission’s lawful authority.

That is ultimately a question of law, not simply opinion. Existing AML and customer interaction conditions confer significant powers, but they cannot be stretched indefinitely to impose obligations that have never been properly adopted.

A settlement doesn’t resolve that question. It is not a court judgment.

Nor does a succession of settlements turn an enforcement preference into legislation.

If the Commission wishes to require general assessments of customers’ financial capacity, it should identify the statutory authority, publish the requirement and subject it to the appropriate regulatory process.

It should not create a second rulebook through enforcement notices.

The danger is that enforcement has become accustomed to obtaining settlements and has started treating its own accumulated interpretations as though they carry the force of law.

It has become drunk on its own power. The perceived ‘success’of enforcement

That question deserves examination by Parliament, particularly if enforcement is operating beyond the boundaries of the Commission’s published policy.

Who protects my customers from the regulator?

The Gambling Act requires the Commission to aim to permit gambling insofar as reasonably consistent with the licensing objectives.

Parliament intended gambling to be lawful.

The Commission’s role is to protect vulnerable people, prevent crime and ensure gambling is fair. It is not to eliminate every possibility that an adult might lose money.

Those objectives do not give it an unlimited mandate to intrude into the private financial affairs of millions of customers.

Every unnecessary intervention makes licensed gambling less attractive.

Every intrusive request for bank statements encourages another customer to close an account.

Some will stop gambling. Others will find somewhere else to bet, including operators outside British regulation. Clearly I object to that..

The Commission acknowledges the danger of the illegal market. It should accept publicly its enforcement culture is contributing to that danger.

My customers deserve protection from fraud, dishonesty and genuinely irresponsible operators.

They also deserve protection from unnecessary regulatory intrusion. The right to say no to someone ringing them up, or worse, as with Big Corp, the suspension of their account if they refuse these measures

They have rights, privacy and the freedom to make their own decisions.So if a customer says he doesn’t want these interventions? He should, as he is with other forms of cold calling, be permitted to say no. To rely on his own recognisance

Those interests should carry considerably more weight than they appear to in the Commission’s enforcement statements.

 Gardner has some explaining to do

The Commission should be held to the same standards of evidence, proportionality and legal accountability that it demands of bookmakers.

Sarah Gardner should explain whether the Commission’s published position on affordability checks remains unchanged.

She should establish whether her enforcement department is applying that policy or imposing additional requirements through settlements.

She should explain whether voluntary operator procedures are being used to aggravate financial penalties.

And she should produce convincing evidence that the financial interventions being encouraged actually reduce gambling harm. Au minimas

The industry also needs to stop treating settlement as the automatic answer to every disagreement with the regulator. If nobody challenges questionable interpretations, they become the standards everyone is expected to follow.

I’ve spent decades building relationships with customers. I know that protecting them matters.

But protecting customers doesn’t mean taking away their judgment, disregarding their objections or treating their money as though it belongs to the state.

My customers are adults. They’re entitled to gamble. They’re entitled to privacy. And they’re entitled to expect the regulator to obey the limits of its own authority.

It’s time Parliament reminded the Gambling Commission of all three.

References: 40 years serving punters

And below? What they see as worthy

The Gambling Commission Is About to Vote Itself More Power. What Could Possibly Go Wrong? 🎰💀

Posted by Geoff Banks | geoffbanks.bet

Somewhere in a Birmingham office, a group of unelected bureaucrats are preparing to vote on whether to impose Financial Risk Assessments on British punters. No parliamentary mandate. No independent scrutiny. No published final pilot report. Just a Board nodding through what they spent six years lobbying for. 🙄

I know. Shocking.

Let’s set the scene. The Gambling Commission’s previous CEO, Andrew Rhodes, departed on 30 April 2026. His replacement as Acting CEO? Step forward Sarah Gardner. The same Sarah Gardner who once told a Danish regulator that she simply cannot accept the argument that driving customers off the regulated market and into illegal alternatives should slow down the Commission’s regulatory ambitions. Cannot accept it. Just won’t have it. 🚫

So the person who has declared black market growth an irrelevance is now running the organisation about to greenlight the policy most likely to cause it. Wonderful. Truly wonderful.


The Math That Isn’t Adding Up 🔢

The Commission’s Director of Major Policy Projects, Helen Rhodes, published a blog in April 2026 reassuring us that only “less than 3% of active customer accounts” would trigger any steps under the FRA proposals, and that 97% of those assessments would be completely frictionless.

Let us pause here and appreciate the artistry.

Three percent of accounts sounds tiny. A rounding error. A statistical footnote. Except the UK has roughly 22 million active betting accounts. Three percent of that is 660,000 people. 660,000 people who will, in the GC’s own framing, have their credit file silently interrogated by a third party data provider without their knowledge or consent, with no appeal mechanism, and with the operator obliged to act on whatever the algorithm spits out.

“Frictionless” for whom, exactly? 🤔

And remember: these are accounts, not people. Many regular punters hold accounts with multiple operators. The same individual triggers the check five times over. The 3% figure is not a measure of consumer impact. It is a number designed to sound reassuring in a press release.


The People Being Targeted Are Not the Problem 🏇💷

Here is the part the Commission really does not want you to think about too carefully. Because when you do, the entire FRA architecture collapses.

The 3% of accounts facing the heaviest scrutiny under FRAs are, by definition, the highest staking customers in the regulated market. These are not, in the main, problem gamblers. They are the economic engine of British horse racing and of the licensed betting industry as a whole.

Dan Waugh of Regulus Partners put it plainly: the problem gambling rate for people who bet on sport online is, in his words, “microscopic” unless those customers are also engaged in online casino products. Horse racing specifically has a lower problem gambling rate within sports betting than almost any other category. 📉

So who does suffer gambling harm at meaningful rates? The evidence consistently points not to the high rolling racing punter sitting in the Members at Goodwood, but to lower income individuals engaged in high margin, high frequency products. Online slots. Fixed odds terminals. Products with house edges of 4%, 10%, 40%. Products where consistent, predictable losses grind down people with less financial resilience. The GSGB data shows that problem gambling prevalence is modestly higher in lower income groups. The open banking studies the Commission itself commissioned showed that, interestingly, the most financially concerning gamblers had income levels around 21% above the average. Higher stakers tend to be higher earners. That is not a surprise. It is arithmetic. 💡

Yet the FRA architecture is calibrated to trigger on spend volume, not on product type, not on income ratio, not on any actual indicator of distress. And spend volume is exactly where the racing punter lives.

SharpBetting’s modelling of different customer types under the EFRC regime tells the story with brutal precision. A roulette player placing hundreds of small bets per day at a 2.7% house edge loses around £5,000 a year. They are almost never triggered for a check. After five years, only 2% of simulated roulette accounts faced an EFRC. An acca punter betting £20 a day on long shot multiples loses £2,690 a year on average. Never triggered once. Not a single check.

Meanwhile a Racing Enthusiast placing £25 bets on two selections a day at 8/1 loses around £1,800 a year. That is less than either the roulette player or the acca punter. Yet 76% of Racing Enthusiast accounts are triggered for a check by year three. A Form Student placing a single careful £500 bet every fortnight on a studied selection loses around £250 a year. 97% of Form Student accounts face a check by year three. She loses the least. She gets checked the most. 🤦

This is not a consumer protection regime. This is a system that identifies and interrogates the customers who bet intelligently on horse racing while waving through the customers who lose more money on online casino games. It is as if the policy were specifically designed to cause maximum disruption to the sport and product with the lowest harm profile in the entire regulated market. 🎯

And the economic consequences of targeting precisely this cohort are devastating. Horse racing receives the Horserace Betting Levy, which last year generated £108 million. That sounds significant. But it is only a fraction of the total. When media rights, sponsorship, marketing and promotional activity funded by betting operators is included, higher staking customers contribute close to six times the value of the Levy back into the sport. We are talking about an economic relationship worth hundreds of millions of pounds to an industry employing tens of thousands of people, sustaining racecourses from Carlisle to Cheltenham, and underpinning the livelihoods of stable staff, trainers, jockeys, vets, bloodstock agents and everyone else in the ecosystem. 🏟️

The Racing Post’s Big Punting Survey found that among those regularly staking £500 or more, more than 50% had already been subjected to affordability checks. Not 3%. More than half. These are the customers on whom racing’s financial survival depends. One in five of those betting at £100 a time has already used a black market bookmaker in the last twelve months. More than one in three of those betting at £1,000 or more per bet has done so. They are not leaving the market because they cannot afford to bet. They are leaving because they are being treated like suspects while the regulator focuses its ideological firepower on the wrong product, the wrong customer, and the wrong type of harm entirely. 🚨

The Commission wants you to believe FRAs are about protecting the vulnerable. The evidence says they are systematically harassing the financially robust while doing next to nothing for the genuinely at risk. It is the regulatory equivalent of conducting drug searches at the golf club while waving through the inner city. And the sport that pays the price is the one that had the lowest harm rate to begin with.


The Commission vs The Commission 🥊

Here is where it gets genuinely funny. If you enjoy regulatory self-contradiction as entertainment, which you absolutely should.

The GC’s Compliance and Enforcement Report for 2019 to 2020 stated, in black and white, that customers wishing to spend more than the national average should be asked to provide payslips, P60s, tax returns or bank statements. Operators were told this was what compliance looked like. Fines followed for those who failed to implement it.

Fast forward to April 2026. Tim Miller, the Commission’s Executive Director, told the Ethical Gambling Forum that in 2026 it cannot be right that regulatory compliance still leads to some operators asking consumers to share financial documentation.

So operators were fined for not asking for documents. And now the Commission is appalled that operators are asking for documents.

The Commission spent four years training bookmakers to demand your payslips, and is now standing in front of a camera looking baffled that bookmakers are demanding your payslips. It is the regulatory equivalent of arson followed by a vigorous public statement condemning fire. 🔥🔥🔥


The Pilot Nobody Reviewed 🕵️

The entire justification for the Board vote rests on the FRA pilot. A pilot that concluded in summer 2025. A pilot for which no final, published, independent evaluation has been made available to the public, to Parliament, or to the industry.

Helen Rhodes’ April 2026 blog was described as an “update on post pilot analysis.” It was a Commission blog post. Written by a Commission employee. Reviewed by the Commission. Published on the Commission website to inform a Commission Board decision.

Dan Waugh of Regulus Partners put it well: the Commission cannot be allowed to mark its own homework, particularly when the dog has a habit of chewing inconvenient facts out of any assessment it undertakes.

No independent review. No OSR sign off. No parliamentary debate. No published data. Just a blog.

This is the evidence base on which they are voting. Take that in. 🤦


408 People Who Know More Than You Do 📢

Over 400 of the most senior figures in British horse racing, including trainers, owners, racecourse executives, and industry veterans, signed an open letter to Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy warning of the catastrophic consequences of FRA implementation. The BHA chief executive warned publicly that the government was sleepwalking into disaster. The Racing Post ran weeks of frontpage coverage detailing consumer harm, black market growth, and the chill on racecourse betting rings.

The Commission’s response? “Much of it has been ill informed or inaccurate.”

Yes. John Gosden: ill informed. The BHA board: inaccurate. 408 signatories representing billions in economic activity: not quite up to speed.

Meanwhile the Commission, whose leadership has no professional background in racing or betting, and which derives much of its ideological scaffolding from public health academics funded by a California based anti gambling billionaire, is, apparently, the voice of reason in this debate. 🎓💰


The Black Market Elephant 🐘

The Racing Post has reported that black market betting now accounts for an estimated 20% of UK racing turnover. William Hill owner Evoke has cited black market penetration as a factor in its UK revenue decline. Multiple senior racing figures have publicly admitted to betting on unregulated sites because they cannot get a bet on in the licensed market.

Sarah Gardner, the new Acting CEO, cannot accept this argument.

The unlicensed operators she cannot be bothered to worry about do not verify age. They do not contribute to the Horserace Betting Levy. They do not fund GamStop. They have no safer gambling obligations whatsoever. They take from the sport and give nothing back. And they are growing precisely because the regulated market is being made progressively more hostile to anyone who wants to have a proper bet.

But sure. Let’s vote to make the regulated market even less accessible. That will definitely fix the problem. 🤡


What Happens Next 📅

The Board votes. FRAs go through. Operators implement. The 3% that becomes 660,000 accounts gets their credit files silently checked. A meaningful proportion of those have insufficient credit data, or flags from financial difficulties unrelated to gambling, or simply do not match the threshold. Their operators are obliged to interact with them. Some will comply with whatever is asked. Many will not. They will close their accounts and open new ones on unlicensed sites based in Curaçao or Gibraltar or nowhere at all.

The Racing Post will write about it. The Commission will say the coverage is ill informed.

The Levy will fall. Racecourses will struggle. Small yards will close. Rural jobs will go.

The Commission will convene a working group to study the issue. They will publish an update blog. It will be written by a Commission employee, reviewed by the Commission, and published on the Commission website.

And somewhere, a Curacao sportsbook will be counting its new British customers and wondering what all the fuss is about. 💻🌴


The Gambling Commission is not a public health body. It is not a Treasury department. It is a licensing authority with a statutory duty under s.22 of the Gambling Act 2005 to aim to permit gambling. That duty has not been repealed. It is simply being ignored.

Vote against it. Write to your MP. Tell the BHA. Tell the BGC. Make some noise.

Because the Commission is about to make a decision it cannot be held accountable for, using evidence it will not publish, on behalf of consumers it does not represent, with consequences it refuses to acknowledge.

And nobody is stopping them. 🚨

Geoff Banks is a licensed remote betting operator. Views expressed are his own.